Mepielan eBulletin - Guest Articles

Rural Heritage as a Driving Force for Sustainable Development and Territorial Cohesion

Fri, 05 Apr 2013 00:00:00 GMT

The European continent has a rich rural heritage, shaped over the years by human activities. It is made up of an exceptional variety of land types, reliefs, climates and crops.

It is possible to consider that heritage provides a bridge between the past and the present, but it is useless to preserve it unless it can be given a guaranteed future and handed down to future generations. It is essential to encourage the key players to act. The heritage has a potential richness and can become a valuable resource, not necessarily in commercial terms, but for those carrying out projects and for the locality concerned. It becomes part of a sustainable development approach as it becomes a product, factor or source of development. The rural heritage therefore contributes towards achieving independent development of rural zones as areas for living and carrying on economic and recreational activities.

Considering the interest generated in several countries by the “European Rural Heritage Observation Guide – CEMAT”[1], of which they already took note at their 13th Ministerial Conference, the ministers responsible for spatial/regional planning of the member states of the Council of Europe adopted at their 15th Session a Resolution on a “Pan-European Charter for the rural heritage: promoting sustainable spatial development: ‘Rural heritage as a factor of territorial cohesion’[2].

The Charter seeks to make rural heritage a real asset to its territory, a factor and a driving force for sustainable spatial development, and to play a decisive part in making rural areas more attractive and in the town-country balance.

1. What is rural heritage?

Until recently, rural heritage was defined in very narrow terms. It was considered to consist of buildings associated with agricultural activity, and particularly with “minor rural heritage” such as wash-houses, mills or chapels. Planners now assign a wider definition to heritage, which is considered to include all the tangible or intangible elements that demonstrate the particular relationship that a human community has established with a territory over time.

Tangible heritage

This is the most easily identifiable part of heritage. It is made up of various elements:

- landscapes, since they result from centuries of human activity on the environment;
- property (buildings for agricultural use, those related to crafts or industry, holiday homes or public buildings that are evidence of specific activities or simply of an architectural style);
- moveable property: this includes objects for domestic use (furniture in regional styles), for religious purposes (furnishings in churches and chapels) and for festive events (carnival floats, village or corporation emblems);
- products which result from an adaptation to local conditions and to cultivation, rearing, processing and culinary traditions – plant varieties (plants, fruit, vegetables, etc.), local animal species and more “elaborate” produce (wine, cheese, pork products, etc.).

Intangible heritage

This part of the heritage is made up of a series of intangible assets that are inseparable from tangible heritage:

- the techniques and skills that have enabled landscapes to be created, houses and furniture to be built and local products to be developed;
- the local dialects, music and oral literature that have emerged from non-written traditions. These means of expression are evidence of a community’s particular influence on its territory and, more generally, of a specific way of living together. They include stories and legends describing individuals or sites that played a part in local history, as well as place names (toponyms), which reflect particular uses or representations;
- ways of organising social life and specific forms of social organisation, such as certain customs and festivals (seasonal, agricultural, etc.).

All these elements make up a living heritage. By identifying and laying claim to these elements, the various parties involved in the rural world invest them with meaning, both for the community and in terms of their heritage value.

2. What does it mean to “assign heritage value”?

“Assigning heritage value” to property or knowledge (individually or collectively) means investing it with meaning. No object or skill is a heritage item in itself. For example, a low wall has heritage value only in terms of its aesthetic value in a landscape, of the construction techniques used or of its link with local history.

The consequences of “assigning heritage value” to an item are:

- it makes a specific item “common property” with potential collective value;
- it introduces a specific type of bond, frequently emotive in nature, between a given item and persons who have no legal tie with it. Accordingly, use of the item supposes that a consensus has been established between the various potential users, i.e. the legal owner and potential “other users”. However, the latter may themselves have different views about possible use.

The Guide advocates a participative approach:

- unless we assume that problems will be settled by legal means such as expropriation, the only possible course of action is negotiation between the parties concerned;
- in order to avoid new arguments or antagonisms arising regularly on what is at stake when defining heritage items, it is essential to include as many potentially interested parties as possible right from the start of any discussions on the use of a heritage item, and to draw on as much information as possible when considering possible uses.

How is heritage created?

Some communities may believe they have “less” heritage than others. However, the absence of monuments does not indicate a lack of heritage: every community possesses archives, an oral tradition, forms of social life, persons with skills, etc.

In any case, all communities, from the richest to the poorest, may make use of their creative capacities.

3. Why should heritage be enhanced?

It is necessary to enhance heritage:

- for the sake of tourism: heritage undoubtedly contributes to an area’s tourist potential and to the economic benefit that may be expected from it. Evaluating the potential for visitors – and possibly improving it – is an integral part of the enhancement project;
- for social and cultural reasons: heritage does more than contribute to aesthetic pleasure and the quality of life; it anchors a population in its history, and roots (inherited or chosen), and gives meaning to the territory. As such, it is one of the constituent elements in local identity and the sense of belonging, a driving force in citizenship and solidarity;
- for economic reasons: the benefits of direct enhancement are easily identifiable: income from entrance fees, rental of farms that have been converted into holiday homes, the sale of bread baked in traditional ovens, etc. However, the indirect effects should also be recognised: visitor structures, shops, etc. This is also true explicitly, in terms of employment (guides, caretakers, escorts) or implicitly, in terms of the quality of life (the arrival of new residents, new businesses);
- for educational reasons: nothing can replace in situ dialogue, practical demonstrations and activities when teaching history, techniques, aesthetics, geography, etc.

4. How can one take action in the field of heritage?

Taking action in the field of heritage means, firstly, identifying its social, cultural and economic value. In so doing, it is essential to know it – and have it recognised – as a heritage item. Secondly, it has to be ensured that it is safeguarded and, possibly, to assign it a new use as part of a project. Finally, it means ensuring that it is handed down to future generations.

Enhancing one’s heritage

- Enhancing means adding value. This value depends on how one views heritage: many heritage items have long been considered in purely functional terms, and the issue of how to conserve them after use never arose. Fascination with scientific, artistic or technological “progress” led to old objects being replaced by new ones, which were thought to be more effective or more in tune with an era’s tastes.
- Enhancement is described as direct when it focuses mainly on the item itself, and indirect when it focuses primarily on the item’s surroundings. In each case, one aspect reinforces the other. Similar houses may have different values (economic, social, cultural, in terms of quality of life, etc) depending on whether they are located in a prestigious area or near a public rubbish tip.

Thinking about heritage in a new way

– Attitudes towards heritage have changed. Things that were previously valued only as tools are now appreciated for their historical value. Equally, they assume a potential cultural, social or economic value, beyond the functional reasons justifying their existence.
– It is impossible, and probably not desirable, to conserve everything, since such conservation is often expensive. Consequently, it is logical to seek to make the most of the heritage’s potential by integrating it into development projects.

The Guide therefore advocates: knowing heritage; obtaining recognition for heritage; restoring heritage; re-assigning heritage; renovating and rehabilitating heritage; handing down heritage; and handing down practices, skills and know-how.

5. What is the purpose of a project?

Before taking any action involving heritage, it is important to define what it is hoped to achieve, why and for whom. When drawing up projects, account of existing general policies and the public, on whose behalf one should act must be taken. It is essential that such projects mobilise a large number of partners and that local residents are involved through a participative approach.

The Guide advocates: putting policies in place; identifing the partners in the participative approach; analysing the various steps in the participative approach; integrating the project into more general approaches; targeting particular sectors of the public; mobilising all players; drawing up the project together with local residents; being concerned with all the elements of heritage.

6. Implementing projects

The implementation of a project concerning a heritage matter has different phases. The creation of a committee for its valorisation enables its better recognition, the confirmation of the wish to intervene and the participation from the start of the stakeholders concerned. The formulation of the draft project includes the choice of a project manager, the search for partners and the elaboration of terms and conditions. The formalisation of the project leads to requests for finance and to its appropriation by other users on the territory.

It will be therefore necessary to bring projects to life, draw up the pre-project, and formalise the project.

Conclusions

With both tangible and intangible aspects, the rural world is a treasure trove of the cultural, natural and landscape heritage. When searching for authenticity, modern people draw on their rural roots, seeking an identity in the rural world. This heritage is also an engine of development. Its preservation is fundamental and gives meaning to the development of our societies. It is our responsibility to recognise the value of the past, and to protect and promote this heritage, which is an essential factor for economic, social and cultural development.

We cannot discuss rural cultural heritage without referring to two obvious facts. The people who use the countryside, who live there and who have often played a decisive role in ensuring that these assets have survived are increasingly aware that it belongs to them and are becoming more vocal on this issue. At the same time, the countryside and the heritage that it represents and contains, is considered to be the property of every individual, including those from towns as well as from the countryside[3].

The Council of Europe’s CEMAT Guide and Resolution invites all those who feel concerned about the future of their territories to be able to meet together, through national and local committees, for the purpose of listing and describing the rural heritage, and thinking about how best to promote it.

ENDNOTES

1. Published initially in English and French, the Guide (Council of Europe document 13 CEMAT (2003) 4) was translated in Italian, Romanian, Russian, Spanish and Swedish. See the websites
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/heritage/cemat/VersionGuide/Anglais.pdf, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/heritage/cemat/VersionGuide/Default_en.asp
See also: http://www.coe.int/EuropeanLandscapeConvention
2. The CEMAT Resolution N° 2 was adopted by the Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Spatial/Regional Planning (CEMAT) in Moscow, Russian Federation, on 9 July 2010. For the text of this Resolution see MEPIELAN E-BULLETIN, Documents & Cases, 25 November 2010 (http://www.mepielan-ebulletin.gr).
3. See Isac Chiva, “Une politique pour le patrimoine culturel rural”, Report to the French Culture Ministry, 1994.

REFERENCES

Council of Europe, Council of Europe Conference of Ministers Responsible for Spatial/Regional Planning (CEMAT), Fundamental Texts 1970-2010, Council of Europe Publishing Editions, Territory and Landscape, 2010, No. 3, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/heritage/Landscape/Publications/CEMATBasicTexts1970-2010_en.pdf
Council of Europe, Sixth Meeting of the Workshops for the Implementation of the European Landscape Convention (Sibiu, Romania, 20-21 September 2007), European spatial planning and landscape, 2009, No. 88, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/heritage/Landscape/Publications/ATEP-88_bil.pdf
Council of Europe, Proceedings of the 15th Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responible for Spatial/Regional Planning (CEMAT), Council of Europe Publishing Editions, European spatial planning and landscape, No. 94, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/heritage/Landscape/Publications/ACTES_MOSCOW.pdf

The Future We Want Might Not Be The Future We Get

Mon, 12 Nov 2012 00:00:00 GMT

Introduction

The Rio+20 Summit is widely regarded as a failure: “Yet another UN mega-conference ends in disappointment…” (IISD 2012); “The Rio+20 Summit produced a largely meaningless document that failed to address the daunting environmental challenges the world faces” (Pearce 2012); the outcome of Rio+20 displays “a colossal failure of leadership and vision” (WWF, quoted in Centre for American Progress 2012). While expectations of civil society, scientists and parts of the business community have been high, the outcomes of Rio+20 are sobering. High hopes had been placed on the two main topics of the summit, the institutional reform agenda and the green economy, with little tangible effects. Instead of delivering a “transformational vision” (Brookings 2012) or a “constitutional moment” (Biermann et al. 2012), the conference has resulted in a final document that restates old commitments without delivering convincing answers to new challenges. As a reflection of what is currently possible in intergovernmental negotiations, the “Future we want” illustrates that current global environmental politics is understood as a zero-sum game by most actors. However, while the concrete outcomes are indeed disappointing, the largely negative assessment of Rio+20 derives from overly naive expectations that misunderstand the nature and purpose of international conferences. Far from being the solution to the sustainability challenge, international summits are largely symbolic events that legitimize actors both internationally and domestically. Instead of debating whether or not multilateralism as a governance approach has to be replaced, discussions should focus on how the summit results can be used to revive global sustainability governance, for example by organizing an inclusive and democratic process on the proposed Sustainable Development Goals.

Great Expectations

An evaluation of the summit outcome must start with the broader context of expectations that have been articulated in the run-up to Rio+20. It is against these overly ambitions demands that the summit is regarded as a failure. It was in particular the scientific community that raised the stakes for Rio+20. Organized by the four global change research programs, DIVERSITAS, the World Climate Research Program, the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program, and the International Humans Dimensions Program on Global Environmental Change (IHDP), the London conference “Planet under Pressure” (26-29 March) brought together more than 3000 participants that urged governments to acknowledge that “the continued functioning of the Earth system as it has supported the well-being of human civilization in recent centuries is at risk” (Brito and Stafford 2012, §1). As a response, scientists called for a “Fundamental reorientation and restructuring of national and international institutions is required to overcome barriers to progress and to move to effective Earth system governance” (Brito and Stafford 2012, §C1).

As an input to the London conference, a group of leading social scientists had compiled an assessment of the current state of knowledge on global environmental governance and the possibilities of institutional reform. In this assessment (Biermann et al. 2012), scholars advocated a far-reaching ‘transformative shift’, equal to the ‘constitutional moment’ that occurred in world politics after the end of WWII. In the words of Biermann and colleagues (2012, 1606): “The world saw a major transformative shift in governance after 1945 that led to the establishment of the UN and numerous other international organizations, along with far-reaching new international legal norms on human rights and economic cooperation. We need similar changes today, a ‘constitutional moment’ in world politics and global governance.” In light of these far-reaching demands, the actual outcome of Rio+20 appears non-ambitious and without vision.

The Future we want: the Rio+20 outcome

The disappointing outcome of Rio+20 is partially the result of the broader systemic factors (such as the global economic and financial crisis) and partially the result of a deliberative strategy of the host country Brazil, which, faced with the thread of a final document that would not meet the approval of all summit participants, opted for presenting a document that was not more than a minimal consensus, but one that could be easily supported by everyone. One week before the official start of the summit, the third preparatory meeting had ended without a consensual draft document, more than 50 percent of the text still being bracketed. Brazil took over the presidency of the preparatory process days before the summit launch and started to delete contested language and overly ambitious proposals. After short deliberations, Brazil declared the final conference documented adopted before the official start of the summit. This move ensured that a consensus document would be adopted, but made it impossible for the arriving heads of state to reopen the discussion and enter into new bargains.

The 282 paragraphs of the official summit declaration (UN 2012), “The future we want”, are organized in six sections that (I) sketch a common vision of sustainable development, placing poverty eradication at its centre (§ 2); (II) restating and reaffirming old commitments, including the Stockholm Declaration, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, with specific emphasis on the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ (§15); (III) address the green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication (§ 56-74); (IV), discuss the institutional framework for sustainable development (§ 75-103); (V) lay out a framework for action and follow-up (§ 104-251); and finally (VI) propose means of implementation. It is noteworthy that the two topics that received the bulk of the attention throughout the preparatory process, the green economy and the institutional reform agenda, are dealt with only in a total of 36 paragraphs, while the chapter on addressing the remaining gaps and future challenges in the sustainable development agenda receives close to 150 paragraphs.

Green economy

In the run-up to Rio+20, the idea of a green economy to boost sustainable technologies, reduce harmful subsidies, de-materialize production and consumption patterns while ensuring a fair distribution of the expected benefits of such a strategy had been controversially discussed. However, most observers expected the green economy discourse to be a major building bloc of any Rio+20 agreement between developed and developing countries. In this light it is surprising to see that the final text on the green economy is very weak, reflecting a missing consensus on the issue. Paragraph 56 states: “In this regard, we consider green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication as one [emphasis added] of the important tools available for achieving sustainable development and that it could provide options for policymaking but should not be a rigid set of rules.” This statement practically ends the discussion about a green economy, placing it among other policies at the disposal of national development priorities.

Institutional reform

The institutional reform agenda did not fare much better. While the zero draft of the summit declaration contained the proposal to upgrade the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to a full-fledged UN organization and to transform the weak Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) into a Sustainable Development Council with greater competences and resources, both reform proposals met fierce resistance by a broad coalition of countries, including major developed countries such as the USA, Canada and Russia. The final summit declaration agrees to strengthen UNEP by universalizing its membership without granting it a higher organizational status in the UN system. In a similar vein, the CSD is not upgraded to a stronger Sustainable Development Council, but it has been decided to establish a “universal intergovernmental high-level political forum” (§ 84), without clarifying in what ways this new institution would go beyond the existing CSD. In particular, a more robust mandate for review and monitoring of existing commitments, a demand frequently made by both the NGO and scientific community, has been postponed. In sum, far from being a transformative change in the institutional architecture of sustainable development, the summit declaration only reaffirms the suspicion that the UN system is immune to reform.

Remaining gaps and new priorities

The few positive results of Rio+20 can be found in chapter V that addresses the remaining gaps and new challenges in the context of a framework for action and follow-up. While the majority of the 26 topical sections (including poverty eradication, climate change, biodiversity, food security, water and sanitation, among others) only restate existing commitments and plans for action, substantive progress could be achieved on oceans and seas (§158-177), including a commitment to maintain or restore fish stocks to the level of maximum sustainable yield by 2015.

A second positive outcome, one that was widely anticipated in the run-up to Rio+20, is the agreement to establish an “inclusive and transparent intergovernmental process on sustainable development goals that is open to all stakeholders, with a view towards developing sustainable development goals to be agreed by the General Assembly” (§248). By 2013, a working group comprising of 30 representatives nominated by the member states will be constituted. While observes had hoped for more concrete terms of references, the mandate of the working group and the general framing of the SDGs is broad enough to ensure a meaningful outcome, provided ongoing public scrutiny.

Beyond “The future we want”, observers have also highlighted the numerous “voluntary commitments” and additional public-private partnerships as the most positive summit outcome. In the words of ICLEI, the global network of local governments for sustainability, the “most remarkable outcome of Rio+20 may indeed be the global and regional, voluntary commitments” (ICLEI 2012). Sha Zukang, the Rio+20 Conference Secretary, underscores: “This Conference is about implementation. It is about concrete action. The voluntary commitments are a major part of the legacy of this Conference” (UNCSD 2012). However, while these commitments indeed show the mainstreaming of the sustainability agenda into the civil society and business communities, Rio+20 failed to establish any framework to monitor the performance of these voluntary commitments.

Conclusion

It seems that the outcome of Rio+20 illustrates the structural inability of mega-conferences and international diplomacy to safeguard sustainable development. In the words of UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner: “We can’t legislate sustainable development in the current state of international relations” (quoted in Pearce 2012). Echoing this assessment, scholars have been quick to dismiss the multi-lateral conference diplomacy as an approach to environmental governance altogether (Andresen and Underdal 2012). While we certainly should search for additional approaches to global environmental governance beyond mega-conferences, what is most needed now is a critical reflection on how the summit results can be used to revive global sustainability governance, for example by organizing an inclusive and democratic process on the proposed Sustainable Development Goals. We do not know the future, but we can guess that the next summit is just ahead. Prepare for Rio+25.

Endnotes

Andresen, Steinar and Aril Underal (2012), We do not need more global sustainability conferences, Initiative on International Environmental Governance towards Rio+20, http://www.ieg.earthsystemgovernance.org/news/2012-06-19/we-do-not-need-more-global-sustainability-conferences.

Biermann, Frank et al. (2012), Navigating the Anthropocene: Improving Global Environmental Governance. Science 335(6074): 1606-1607.

Brito, Lidia and Mark Stafford (2012), State of the Planet Declaration, http://www.planetunderpressure2012.net/pdf/state_of_planet_declaration.pdf.

Brookings (2012), The Rio+20 Conference: A useful forum for external commitments, but no transformative vision, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/06/25-rio-20-conference-hultman.

Centre for American Progress (2012), How the Rio+20 Earth Summit could have been better, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/06/26/11797/how-the-rio20-earth-summit-could-have-been-better/.

ICLEI (2012), ICLEI at Rio+20, http://local2012.iclei.org/fileadmin/files/ICLEI_at_Rio_20.pdf.

IISD (2012), Life after Rio: A commentary, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/com_life_after_rio.pdf.

Pearce, Fred (2012), Beyond Rio, green economics can give us hope, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jun/28/rio-green-economics-hope.

United Nations (2012), Draft Resolution submitted by the President of the General Assembly: The future we want,
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N12/436/88/PDF/N1243688.pdf?OpenElement.

United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, UNCSD, (2012), Rio+20 Voluntary Commitments,
http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/790Summary%20of%20Voluntary%20Commitments%20Registered%20at%20Rio20%20v6.pdf.

The Present Nature and Extent of Maritime Zones in the Mediterranean Sea

Wed, 22 Feb 2012 00:00:00 GMT

1. An Overview

The general rules of international law on the regime and extent of maritime zones within national jurisdiction, as set forth in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), apply also in semi-enclosed seas, such as the Mediterranean Sea[1]. Despite a certain number of maritime boundaries waiting to be agreed upon by the Mediterranean States concerned, there is no doubt that States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are entitled to establish exclusive economic zones whenever they wish to do so, even though for geographical reasons they cannot claim a full size 200-mile zone[2]. International law does not prevent States bordering seas of limited dimensions from establishing their own exclusive economic zones[3], provided that maritime boundaries are not unilaterally imposed by one State on its adjacent or opposite neighbouring States[4].

In the case of the maritime zones established in Mediterranean Sea, which is surrounded by twenty-two coastal States[5], a number of peculiarities must be taken into account that make the present picture particularly complex.

Not all the Mediterranean coastal States have so far decided to establish an exclusive economic zone.

Some coastal States have proclaimed beyond the territorial sea sui generis zones, namely a fishing zone or an ecological protection zone. While neither of them is mentioned in the UNCLOS, they are not prohibited either. They encompass only some of the rights that can be exercised within the exclusive economic zone. Such a fragmentation of rights seems compatible with the applicable rules of international law, also on the basis of the general principle that the right to do less is implied in the right to do more (in maiore stat minus). The current picture of national coastal zones is summarized hereunder.

2. Present Mediterranean Maritime Zones

(A) Internal Waters

As regards internal waters, several Mediterranean States (Albania, Algeria, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Montenegro, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey) apply legislation measuring the breadth of the territorial sea from straight baselines joining specific points located on the mainland or islands. Historical bays are claimed by Italy (Gulf of Taranto) and Libya (Gulf of Sidra).

(B) Territorial Sea

Most Mediterranean States have established a 12-mile territorial sea. The exceptions are the United Kingdom (3 n.m. for Gibraltar[6] and the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia on the island of Cyprus), Greece (6 n.m.) and Turkey (6 n.m. in the Aegean Sea, but 12 n.m. elsewhere).

(C) Fishings Zones

Five States have declared a fishing zone beyond the limit of the territorial sea.

Based on legislation dating back to 1951 (Decree of the Bey of 26 July 1951) which was subsequently confirmed (Laws No. 63-49 of 30 December 1963 and No. 73-49 of 2 August 1973), Tunisia has established along its southern coastline (from Ras Kapoudia to the frontier with Libya) a fishing zone delimited according to the criterion of the 50-meter isobath[7]. In 1978, Malta established a 25-mile exclusive fishing zone (Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone Amendment Act of 18 July 1978). Under Legislative Act No. X of 26 July 2005, fishing waters may be designated beyond the limits laid down in the 1978 Act and jurisdiction in these waters may also be extended to artificial islands, marine scientific research and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.

In 1994, Algeria created a fishing zone whose extent is 32 n.m. from the maritime frontier with Morocco to Ras Tenes and 52 n.m. from Ras Tenes to the maritime frontier with Tunisia (Legislative Decree No. 94-13 of 28 May 1994).

In 1997, Spain established a fishing protection zone in the Mediterranean (Royal Decree 1315/1997 of 1 August 1997, modified by Royal Decree 431/2000 of 31 March 2000). The zone is delimited according to the line which is equidistant between Spain and the opposite or adjacent coasts of Algeria, Italy and France[8].

In 2005 Libya established a fisheries protection zone whose limits extend seaward for a distance of 62 n.m. from the external limit of the territorial sea (General People’s Committee Decision No. 37 of 24 February 2005), according to the geographical co-ordinates set forth in General People’s Committee Decision No. 105 of 21 June 2005.

(D) Ecological Protection Zones

Three States have adopted legislation for the establishment of an ecological protection zone.

In 2003, France adopted Law No. 2003-346 of 15 April 2003 which provides that an ecological protection zone may be created. In this zone France exercises only some of the powers granted to the coastal State under the exclusive economic zone regime, namely the powers relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research and the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures. A zone of this kind was established along the French Mediterranean coast by Decree No. 2004-33 of 8 January 2004 which specifies the co-ordinates to define the external limit of the zone. The French zone partially overlaps with the Spanish fishing zone.

In 2005, Slovenia provided for the establishment of an ecological protection zone (Law of 4 October 2005)[9].

In 2006, Italy adopted a framework legislation for ecological protection zones (Law No. 61 of 8 February 2006) to be established by decrees. Within the ecological zones, Italy will exercise powers which are not limited to the prevention and control of pollution, but extend also to the protection of marine mammals, biodiversity and the archaeological and historical heritage. The first of the implementing enactments is the Decree of the President of the Republic of 27 October 2011, No. 209, which establishes an ecological protection zone in the Ligurian and Tyrrhennian Seas.

(E) A Fishing and Ecological Zone

One Mediterranean State has established a zone for both fishing and ecological purposes.

On 3 October 2003, the Croatian Parliament adopted a “decision on the extension of the jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia in the Adriatic Sea” and proclaimed “the content of the exclusive economic zone related to the sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the living resources beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea, as well as the jurisdiction with regard to marine scientific research and the protection and preservation of the marine environment, whereby the ecological and fisheries protection zone of the Republic of Croatia is established as of today” (Art. 1). However, on 3 June 2004, the Parliament amended the 2003 decision in order to postpone implementation of the ecological and fishing zone with regard to Member States of the European Union.

(F) Exclusive Economic Zones

A number of States have established, or officially announced the establishment of, an exclusive economic zone.

In 1981, Morocco created a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (Dahir No. 1-81-179 of 8 April 1981), without making any distinction between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean coasts.

Upon ratifying the UNCLOS on 26 August 1983, Egypt declared that it “will exercise as from this day the rights attributed to it by the provisions of parts V and VI of the (...) Convention (...) in the exclusive economic zone situated beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Red Sea”.

By Law No. 28 of 19 November 2003 Syria provided for the establishment of an exclusive economic zone.

Cyprus proclaimed an exclusive economic zone under the Exclusive Economic Zone Law adopted on 2 April 2004.

Tunisia established an exclusive economic zone under Law No. 2005-60 of 27 June 2005. The modalities for the implementation of the law will be determined by decree.

Under a declaration of 27 May 2009 and a decision of 31 May 2009, No. 260, Libya proclaimed an exclusive economic zone. The external limit of the zone will be determined by agreements with the neighbouring States concerned.

By a framework Law adopted on 19 September 2011 Lebanon established its exclusive economic zone. Three annexes define the limits of the zone between Lebanon and, respectively, Syria, Cyprus and Palestine.

In fact, while the Mediterranean may be considered today a sea in transition towards a generalized exclusive economic zone regime, some high seas areas still exist in this semi-enclosed sea. This particular situation must be taken into consideration as far as the present regional regimes of fisheries or of the protection of the marine environment are concerned.

Endnotes

The Mediterranean Sea is a semi-enclosed sea according to the definition provided by UNCLOS Art. 122: “For the purposes of this Convention, ‘enclosed or semi-enclosed sea’ means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States”.
For geographical reasons there is no point in the Mediterranean which is locate at more than 200 n.m. from the nearest land or island.
In fact, exclusive economic zones have been established in other semi-enclosed seas, such as the Black, the Baltic and the Caribbean Seas.
As remarked by the International Court of Justice in the judgment of 18 December 1951 on the Fisheries case, “the delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessariliy a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is comptent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international law” (International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1951, p. 20).
Spain, the United Kingdom (as far as Gibraltar and the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia are concerned), France, Monaco, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco.
A longlasting dispute is pending between Spain and the United Kingdom as to whether Gibraltar is entitled to a territorial sea.
The area where the Tunisian fishing zone is located is considered by Italy as a high seas zone of biological protection where fishing by Italian vessels or nationals is prohibited (Decree of 25 September 1979).
No fishing zone was established as regards the Spanish Mediterranean coast facing Morocco.
Croatia has objected to the right of Slovenia to establish national coastal zones beyond the territorial sea.

Transforming the World Economy at Rio Plus 20

Wed, 21 Sep 2011 00:00:00 GMT

The next major global environmental conference will occur in June 2012, with the uninspiring name of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, or Rio Plus 20. It is aimed at promoting the shift to a green economy. After the first preliminary prepcom meetings (16-18 May 2010 in NY, 7-8 March in NY), the first intersessional (10-11 January 2011 in NY) and the failed UNCSD meeting in May 2011, discussions have been quite impoverished in terms of imagination and passion.

The formal agenda (http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/) while still a bit preliminary, calls for efforts to accelerate the shift to a green economy and institutional reform arrangements. Unfortunately this is a seriously disjointed agenda, as each component appeals to different constituencies, and the combined benefits of the disjointed agenda are modest, at best.

While still a work in progress, the “green economy” appears to encompass cleaner economic production and a low or no carbon economy. It includes both hardware components involving new technologies, as well as software components (or policy components) involving policy changes (such as eliminating market biasing subsidies for polluting technologies). This is a noble prospect of trying to develop the next global large scale socio-economic system, promoting the broader transformative processes of creative destruction analyzed by Schumpeter, Polanyi and scholars of innovation. (Schumpeter 1942; Polanyi 1944; Dosi, Freeman et al. 1988; Nelson 2005)

Promoting green technology requires a massive effort. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2009 suggests that a 14% reduction in energy consumption from 2012 Kyoto limits by 2030 is needed to keep atmospheric carbon concentrations at 450 ppm. Such goals are not yet feasible with available technologies, and we still need a massive innovation push to create these green technologies.(Pacala and Socolow 2004; Weizsacker, Hargroves et al. 2009) Recent IPCC estimates suggest that the cost of transitioning to renewables over the next 20 years could run to 15 trillion dollars US. [Financial times 5/10/11, Fiona Harvey “Renewable Energy can power the world, says landmark IPCC study” guardian.co.uk, Monday 9 May 2011.] UNEP suggests the cost would be roughly 2% of GDP per year. While the industrialized North wishes to pursue this goal through technological change and industrial policy, the developing South is more skeptical, and is primarily focused on job creation and ensuring that there are no serious repercussions for their economies from such a major technological shift.

But technological innovation isn’t independent of social change, as Polanyi made clear. Not only does technological change have large scale political consequences, it rests on profound political and social foundations. Technologies are embedded in social structures. (La Porte 1991) Large scale technological change of this magnitude requires a common purpose, political support by a powerful network of actors, and an institutional landscape that reinforces economic forces as well as consolidating the social influence of those associated with the broader project. Previous global conferences such as the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) and the 1992 World Conference on Sustainable Development only succeeded when they were buffered from deeper geopolitical divides (as is the case, now) and resonated with domestic concern in the major powers. (Putnam and Bayne 1987; Willetts 1989; Haas 2002) Even 25 years after the Brundtland Commission Report, Sustainable Development remains more of a vague aspiration than a common project, and does not appear to yet satisfy the second condition.

The institutional part of the Rio Plus 20 agenda remains disconnected from the broad ambitious purpose for the conference. Discussions have revolved around UN restructuring -- largely ECOSOC reform and UNCSD reform -- that are tired old debates that are unlikely to yield any kind of systemic results.

Institutional reform talks have also focused heavily on UNEP’s future. To some extent this is a matter of the tail wagging the dog, as UNEP is best positioned to work on environmental problems, rather than the broader scope of Sustainable Development and the green economy. Discussions about UNEP’s future have followed a tortuous path for nearly 14 years. At a meeting in Espoo, Finland in November 2010 these ideas for UNEP’s future role in environmental governance were summarized. [UNEP/CGIEG.2/2/2]

Focus on scientific matters
Cluster existing MEAs
Upgrade UNEP to a UN agency (UNEO)
Streamline UNEP with other bodies (such as UNDP)
Create a new centralized World Environment Organization (WEO) responsible for all MEAs and able to advocate for environmental protection at WTO

Serious discussions about promoting a green technological transformation need to go well beyond UNEP, and tinkering with existing UN arrangements, to think much more seriously about ambitious new plans to foster political support for what are emerging as good economic policy ideas. UNEP can play a role in the broader constellation of institutions for monitoring environmental quality particularly with an eye to generating early warning signals of loss of resilience, and coordinating scientific assessments of sustainability.

But the core reality is that we need a political realignment to promote creative destruction. Before meaningful support for such large scale changes, and the UN conference can occur, we must stimulate the involvement of organized networks of actors engaged in the green economy project, including Finance, Development and Trade Ministries; as well as a wide variety of non-state actors including clean energy firms, manufacturing, insurance, and investment capitalists. The eventual formal institutions coming out of Rio could help support and disseminate new breakthrough technologies, as well as overseeing or coordinating BEP and BAT sectoral codes.

Without building the social capacity for sustainable development, governments will be unresponsive and policy proposals are likely to go unheard.

References

Dosi, G., C. Freeman, et al., Eds. (1988). Technical Change and Economic Theory. New York, Columbia University Press.
Haas, P. (2002). "UN Conferences and Constructivist Governance of the Environment." Global Governance 8(1): 73-91.
Nelson, R. R. (2005). Technology Institutions and Economic Growth. Cambidge, Harvard University Press.
Pacala, S. and R. Socolow (2004). "Stabilization Wedges." Science 305(5698): 968-972.
Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation. New York, Farrar & Rinehart.
Putnam, R. D. and N. Bayne (1987). Hanging Together. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York, Harper and Row.
Weizsacker, E. v., K. Hargroves, et al. (2009). Factor Five: Transforming the Global Economy through 80% Improvements in Resource Productivity. London, Earthscan.
Willetts, P. (1989). The Pattern of Conferences. Global Issues in the United Nations' Framework. P. Taylor and A. J. R. Groom. New York, St Martin's Press.

The ILO’s Maritime Labour Convention, 2006: Filling a Gap in the Law of the Sea

Thu, 07 Apr 2011 00:00:00 GMT

1. The Relevance of International Labour and Social Standards to Achieving Marine Environmental Protection

An article concerned with an international labour instrument, even if dealing with maritime sector, may seem an unusual topic for the MEPIELAN E-BULLETIN with its primary focus on marine environmental and ecosystem concerns. The fact that the instrument in question, the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006[1] (MLC, 2006), is a multilateral maritime convention adopted in 2006 by the tripartite International Labour Conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO)[2], rather than the more familiar International Maritime Organization (IMO), only serves to adds to the mystery about its relevance.
This article argues that, not only are labour, social and economic matters relevant to marine environmental protection, they should be viewed as central concerns. Too often, the human and economic dimensions are left out of discussions about preventing ship source operational or accidental harms to the marine environment.[3] However this concern – the working and living conditions and social rights for ocean workers/ seafarers/ fishers, or, perhaps in the future, other ocean dwellers, is so sparsely dealt with in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) that it can be considered a regime gap[4]. Certainly the human condition as distinct from the activities of humans received significantly less attention than marine environmental protection, navigational freedoms or fishing or marine scientific research the LOSC[5]. This is not say there is an absence of international instruments addressing social and labour conditions for ocean workers – seafarers and fishers[6] - the point is that these matters are not generally seen as a LOSC concern.
However, as indicated in the following extract from Preamble, the MLC, 2006 is expressly and firmly anchored in the wider LOSC regime and international maritime regulatory regime:

…Recalling that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, sets out a general legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out and is of strategic importance as the basis for national, regional and global action and cooperation in the marine sector, and that its integrity needs to be maintained, and

Recalling that Article 94 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, establishes the duties and obligations of a flag State with regard to, inter alia, labour conditions, crewing and social matters on ships that fly its flag,..

It will also be recalled that when the LOSC was adopted it was understood as creating “…a legal order for the seas and oceans” ( Preamble. LOSC).[7] The key provisions of the LOSC concerning rights and responsibilities for labour and social standards are found in Article 94[8]:

Article 94 - Duties of the flag State

1. Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.

In particular every State shall….

(b) assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and its master, officers and crew in respect of administrative, technical and social matters concerning the ship…

3. Every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to:…

(a) the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews, taking into account the applicable international instruments; …

5. In taking the measures called for in paragraphs 3 and 4 each State is required to conform to generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices and to take any steps which may be necessary to secure their observance.

2. Overview of the ILO’s Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 ( MLC, 2006)

The MLC, 2006 comprising over a 100 pages of text, elaborates a comprehensive code, developed over 5 years of complex tripartite international negotiations that sets out rights and responsibilities as well as more technical minimum standards for working and living conditions for a diverse and wider range of workers (inclusively called” seafarers”[9]) in this industry. Consistent with the complexities of the earliest of the globalize economic sector[10] the Convention establishes a system based on responsibilities for flag States, port States, and to a a lesser degree coastal States, as well as introducing a new “face” for State responsibility under the LOSC framework, the State with labour-supplying responsibilities Sometimes described as the “Seafarers’ bill of rights” the MLC, 2006 is an instrument that seeks to achieve both social and labour rights (“decent work”) that are interwoven with more economic fair competition considerations (achieving a level-playing field for shipowners). It has been described as the “fourth pillar” of the international maritime regulatory regime complementing the major IMO conventions, SOLAS, MARPOL and STCW, all of which are intended to ensure the safety, security of shipping and the protection of marine environment from ship source pollution.[11]

From an ILO’s perspective the MLC, 2006 brings together and modernizes the majority of the ILO ‘s legal instruments adopted since 1920 (37 Conventions and related Recommendations) for this sector. It sets out minimum requirements for seafarers to work on a ship (e.g., minimum age, medical fitness), conditions of employment, including important matters such as a contract of employment (seafarers’ employment agreement (SEA)) minimum hours of work or rest, wages, leave, repatriation, on board accommodation, recreational facilities, food and catering, as well as occupational safety and health protection, medical care, access to seafarer welfare centres and social security protection.

Importantly, it presents a very interesting example of inter-institution learning as it builds upon, and, arguably, develops the best practices under the international regulatory regime.[12] In that respect the MLC, 2006 establishes a compliance and enforcement system based on inspection and certification of labour and social conditions for seafarers, carried out by the authorities of the flag States and complemented by port State inspection (port State control – PSC) , as well as being linked to the extensive and long established ILO supervisory system that examines State level implementation obligations. In order to encourage fair competition, the Convention requires port States to ensure that ships of non-ratifying States do not receive more favorable treatment during port State inspections than ships of ratifying States receive.[13] The Convention expressly seeks to attract widespread ratification through a mix of firmness on rights combined with flexibility on implementation supported by a tripartite approach to implementation at the national level.

But it goes even further as it establishes a comprehensive system for compliance and enforcement that goes beyond State level compliance to specifically affect private actors. The system allows for the possibility of complaints by individual seafarers, and moves through to flag State inspection, port State control and ultimately links to the ILO’s supervisory system (that also includes the possibility of complaints by workers and employers regarding State level compliance). In that respect the MLC, 2006 is one of the new generation of international conventions that seek to achieve “effectiveness” by reaching beyond the State by more directly interacting with and affecting behaviours of private or individual actors in the State. In so doing it cuts across traditional international law divides between public and private actors and notions of “State responsibility”.[14]

Typically for an ILO Convention it allows implementation in laws and/or regulations or collective agreements or other measure, thus emphasizing the important role of the national social partners, the workers and employers, in implementing international obligations.

3. Ratification and Implementation of the MLC, 2006

February 2011 witnessed the 5th anniversary of the adoption of the MLC, 2006, an event marked by Switzerland’s ratification. It is a point of interest that despite what was essentially unanimous adoption in 2006, the Convention has not yet achieved the ( admittedly challenging) formula for entry into force (12 months after ratification by 30 Members (ILO Member States) with a total share in the world gross tonnage of ships of at least 33 per cent (Article VIII)). Curiously and, perhaps even ironically, although all the major flag State have ratified the Convention, and ratifications currently cover seafarers on nearly 48% of the world fleet, the Convention has only been ratified by twelve (12) countries.[15] This means that eighteen (18) more ratifications must be obtained to achieve the entry into force formula in 2011, with actual entry into force 12 months later. It was expected, with the decision by the European Union (EU) in 2007 regarding ratification by its Members by the end of December 2010 and the agreement between the social partners in the EU - an agreement that will become a Directive once the Convention enters into force[16]- that the other aspect, the ratification by at least 30 Members would be achieved by December 2010. Although December 2010 has now passed, the goal of five years may still be possible, as there has been significant progress in other countries, particularly in the Asia, Southeast Asia and Pacific region. Many countries in the Caribbean are moving forward now, as well as several countries in Africa. But, not surprisingly, the global economic destabilization and other political events and major natural disasters have had an impact on national legislative agendas.

4. Conclusion: The Need to Bring the MLC, 2006, Into Force

This brings me back to my original point regarding the somewhat overlooked environmental importance of the MLC, 2006. From an environmental perspective we cannot ignore the fact that too often ship-source pollution, especially in the case of accidents, is often attributable to fatigue or other “human element” factors. With the growing pressure to reduce operating costs on ships, as a matter of competitiveness, the pressure to reduce the cost of the labour component will increase. Yet according to the IMO, the industry is also facing a future scarcity of qualified seafarers[17]. Poor working conditions mean that seafaring is not an attractive career choice for many young people, particularly for women. It is, however, clear from concerns voiced at the IMO that there is an urgent need to ensure trained personnel as well as establishing working conditions that avoid fatigue or other occupational safety and health hazards arising from workplace conditions.[18] Along with the decent work requirements under the MLC, 2006 these are key elements in ensuing safer ships and better protection of the marine environment in all regions of the world.

* Moira L. McConnell is an author of Moira L. McConnell, Dominick Devlin, Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry, The Maritime Labour Convention, 2006. A Legal Primer to an Emerging International Regime (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff/Brill: 2011); see: http://www.brill.nl/mlc_2006

Endnotes

ILO, “Maritime Labour Convention, 2006,” available at http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-convention/WCMS_090250/lang-en/index.htm. The MLC, 2006, adopted on 23 February 2006, is available in (8) eight languages ( it was adopted in English and French and both language versions are considered equally authoritative (Art. XVI) MLC, 2006).
The ILO is the earliest of what came to be (after 1945) the United Nations specialized organizations. It was established in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles. Under the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation the “State” is conceived of as a tripartite entity comprising Workers, Employers and Government. Although only Governments can ratify Conventions (and be held accountable in international law), all three vote on the adoption of international legal instruments using a weighted voting formula.
The idea of the a move seaward into ocean space as the new “frontier” was embraced in the, perhaps naοve, optimism of the 1960 and 70s, and is now seeing some resurgence of interest as activities are more viable further from shore. See for e.g., Maria Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea, Volume 62, Publications on Ocean Development (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) or Bernard Oxman “ The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea” Centennial Essays, (2006) 100 AJIL 830- 851.
M. L. McConnell, “‘Making Labour History’ and the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006: Implications for International Law Making (and Responses to the Dynamics of Globalization),” in The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston, Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman, and Susan J. Rolston, eds. (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff/ Brill, 2009), 349–384.
Consider for example, Part XII dealing with protection of the marine environment.
The ILO has over 70 instruments on maritime labour matters. In 2007 it also adopted the comprehensive Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (Convention No. 188)

Arguably, the treatment of labour and social issues was reduced in 1982 in comparison to the provisions in the relevant predecessor convention, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. For example, paragraph 3(b) of Article 94 1982 LOSC refers to labour conditions and only requires States to ‘take account’ of international instruments, rather than international labour instruments as required under the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. Perhaps this reflects the fact that by then the IMO had also begun to look at manning and seafarer training and in some quarters was viewed as the (only) ‘competent organization’ in the reference under the LOSC. See: Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 29 April 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf, at Article 10 (emphasis added):

Every State shall take such measures for ships under its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to:
(a) The manning of ships and labour conditions for crews taking into account the applicable international labour instruments;
In taking such measures each State is required to conform to generally accepted international standards and to take any steps which may be necessary to ensure their observance.

Although directed to responsibility on the high seas, these provisions de facto frame the overall regime for the regulation in this sector since shipping would be operationally impossible, if ships on international voyages faced significantly different regulatory regimes in the exclusive economic zone or territorial sea of other States.
Article II, paragraph 1 (f) seafarer means any person who is employed or engaged or works in any capacity on board a ship, to which the Convention applies. A ship is also inclusively defined in Art. II, paragraph 1 (i) ship means a ship other than one which navigates exclusively in inland waters or waters within, or closely adjacent to, sheltered waters or areas where port regulations apply. There are very few exclusions for ships and unlike IMO conventions there is no minimum tonnage for application of the Convention. The exclusion under Article II, paragraph 4 are:“ Except as expressly provided otherwise, this Convention applies to all ships, whether publicly or privately owned, ordinarily engaged in commercial activities, other than ships engaged in fishing or in similar pursuits and ships of traditional build such as dhows and junks. This Convention does not apply to warships or naval auxiliaries.”

We cannot ignore the fact, as noted in Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry, Dominick Devlin and Moira L. McConnell, The Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 Consolidates Seafarers’ Labour Instruments (2006) Vol 10, Issue 23, ASIL Insight (e- publication), that:

The maritime sector, in particular international shipping, is one of the earliest and most internationalized, with the beneficial ownership of ships often based in one State even though the ships operate under the jurisdiction of yet other States (flag States) and the seafarers on board are drawn from numerous States. The jurisdictional problems this can create and the issue of ensuring flag State responsibility have been topics of concern for this sector since the 1950s .

Speech to the ILC by Mr. Efthimios Mitropoulos, Secretary-General, International Maritime Organization, 94th ( Maritime) Session, ILC, February 20, 2006, Fourth Sitting, Provisional Record 10, p. 2. The three IMO convention are: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (SOLAS); International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping, 1978, as amended (STCW); International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 73/78 (MARPOL).
Although now primarily concerned with the IMO conventions, it is interesting to note that the Paris MOU on PSC was developed in response to an ILO convention adopted in 1976.
MLC, 2006 Article V, paragraph 7.
For an interesting analysis of this issue generally see: Natasha A. Affolder, “The Private Life of Environmental Treaties,” (2009) 103 American Journal of International Law 510. Her research explores the corporate performance and even ‘colonization’ of treaties arguing that increasingly there is a direct interaction between corporations and treaty performance, an issue that in her view has “long been a blind spot in international legal analysis” (p. 511).
In order of ratification they are: Liberia, Marshall Islands, Bahamas, Panama, Norway, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Spain, Croatia, Bulgaria, Canada, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and, most recently, Switzerland.
The Council adopted a Decision on 7 July 2007 authorizing member States to ratify the ILO’s MLC, 2006 in the interests of the European Community, preferably before 31 December 2010 (see EU Official Journal: L 161/63, 22 June 2007). On 19 May 2008, the EU social partners representing management and labour in the maritime transport sector (European Community Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA) and the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF)) entered into the Agreement on the MLC, 2006, and requested the European Commission to propose a Council Directive giving effect to their Agreement and its Annex A under EU law, in accordance with article 139 of the Treaty. A Directive was adopted in February 2009. See:"Council Directive 2009/13/EC of 16 February 2009 implementing the Agreement concluded by the European Community Shipowners Association the European Transport Workers' Federation on the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, and amending Directive 1999/63/EC". It will enter into force at the same time as the MLC, 2006.
IMO “Go to sea” campaign, launched in 2008: see http://www.imo.org/ourwork/humanelement/gotosea
See the recent “Manila amendments” of June 2010 to the STCW regarding, inter alia, minimum hours of rest and medical examinations that largely replicate the MLC, 2006.

Spatial/Regional Planning: A Territorial Dimension of Human Rights and Democracy

Tue, 21 Dec 2010 00:00:00 GMT

“The Territory is a complex system, comprising not only urbanised, rural and other spaces, eg industrial land, but nature as a whole and the environment surrounding humankind. It is the bearing ground and indispensable framework of human dwelling and activity, and therefore the basis of sustainable development. The spatial development approach is an essential method in achieving the sustainable development objective.”

Ljubljana Declaration on the territorial dimension of spatial development, 13th CEMAT

The Council of Europe actively promotes sustainable development in line with Recommendation Rec (2002) 1 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent, which were adopted initially by the Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional/Spatial Planning (CEMAT). The Action Plan adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Third Council of Europe Summit in Warsaw, on 17 May 2005, includes a section on “Promoting sustainable development” which provides that: “We are committed to improving the quality of life for citizens. The Council of Europe shall therefore, on the basis of the existing instruments, further develop and support integrated policies in the fields of environment, landscape, spatial planning and prevention and management of natural disasters, in a sustainable development perspective”.

This involves establishing a new integrated spatial development policy which fosters social, economic and territorial cohesion, the preservation of nature and the cultural heritage, an improved living environment and more balanced competitiveness of territory. In this connection, standard-setting work concerning the natural, cultural and landscape heritage – ie both nature and the work of humankind – has been in progress for over 50 years. Five conventions which can be described as “heritage” conventions have been adopted by the Council of Europe to date. In chronological order, they are as follows:

–   the European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, opened for signature in London on 6 May 1969, revised in Valletta on 16 January 1992;
–   the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, opened for signature in Bern on 19 September 1979;
–   the Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe, opened for signature in Grenada on 3 October 1985;
–   the European Landscape Convention, opened for signature in Florence on 20 October 2000;
–   the Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, opened for signature in Faro on 27 October 2007.

The many resolutions and recommendations issued by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to the Organisation’s member states have also guided European policies in this area and have played a part in preparing, interpreting or expanding the international conventions.

The Council of Europe’s European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional/Spatial Planning (CEMAT) brings together representatives of the Council’s member states in pursuit of a shared objective: sustainable spatial development of the European continent. The CEMAT is a forum for considering issues of sustainable spatial development and a platform for exchanging and disseminating information. It is the only framework for pan-European co-operation on spatial development policies within which members and non-members of the European Union can gather on an equal footing at the level of Greater Europe.   The Council of Europe’s activities relating to spatial planning began in 1970 in Bonn with the first European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning. They originated in concerns raised from the early 1960s by the then Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, which were reflected in the presentation in May 1968 of a historic report on “Regional planning – A European problem”. The activities conducted since then have seen the adoption of several basic documents which have shaped European governments’ spatial development policies:

–   the European Regional/Spatial Planning Charter, adopted at the 6th Session of the CEMAT in Torremolinos in 1983 and incorporated in Recommendation (84) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Regional/Spatial Planning Charter;
–   the European Regional Planning Strategy presented at the 8th Session of the CEMAT in Lausanne in 1988;
–   the Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent, adopted at the 12th Session of the CEMAT in Hanover in 2000 and incorporated in Recommendation (2002) 1 by the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent (GPSSDEC-CEMAT).

The various activities have been conducted in close liaison with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe.

1. The concept of regional/spatial planning

According to the European Regional/Spatial Planning Charter:

“Regional/spatial planning gives geographical expression to the economic, social, cultural and ecological policies of society. It is at the same time a scientific discipline, an administrative technique and a policy developed as an interdisciplinary and comprehensive approach directed towards a balanced regional development and the physical organisation of space according to an overall strategy”.

The Charter refers to the European dimension and the specific characteristics of regional/spatial planning:

Its European dimension: Regional/spatial planning contributes to a better spatial organisation in Europe and to finding solutions to problems which go beyond the national framework, and thus aims to create a feeling of common identity, bearing in mind North/South and East/West relations.

Its characteristics: Humankind and its well-being as well as its interaction with the environment are the central concern of regional/spatial planning, whose aims are to provide each individual with an environment and quality of life conducive to the development of his/her personality in surroundings planned on a human scale.

Regional/spatial planning should be democratic, comprehensive, functional and oriented towards the longer term:

–   Democratic: it should be conducted in such a way as to ensure the participation of the people concerned and their political representatives;
–   Comprehensive: it should ensure the co-ordination of the various sectoral policies and integrate them in an overall approach;
–   Functional: it needs to take account of the existence of regional consciousness based on common values, culture and interests sometimes crossing administrative and territorial boundaries, while taking account of the institutional arrangements of the different countries;
–   Long-term oriented: it should analyse and take into consideration the long-term trends and developments of economic, social, cultural, ecological and environmental phenomena and interventions.

Its operation: Regional/spatial planning should take into consideration the existence of a multitude of individual and institutional decision-makers who influence the organisation of space, the uncertainty of all forecasting studies, market pressures, special features of administrative systems and different socio-economic and environmental conditions. It must, however, strive to reconcile these influences in the most harmonious way possible.

The fundamental objectives identified in the Charter are as follows:

–   Balanced socio-economic development of the regions;
–   Improvement of the quality of life;
–   Responsible management of natural resources and protection of the environment;
–   Rational use of land.

Implementation of regional/spatial planning objectives: The achievement of regional/spatial planning objectives is essentially a political matter. Many private and public agencies contribute by their actions to developing and changing the organisation of space. Regional/spatial planning reflects the desire for interdisciplinary integration and co-ordination and for co-operation between the authorities involved. It also requires public participation.

2. The Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent

Recommendation Rec (2002) 1 of the Committee of Ministers states that the Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent are the following:

–    a major contribution towards implementation of the strategy of social cohesion adopted at the Second Summit of Heads of State and Government of Council of Europe member states in 1997;
–    a policy framework document which takes into account the relevant activities of the Council of Europe and its bodies, and in particular the work of its Parliamentary Assembly and its Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, in the area of continental spatial development policy and which could contribute to strengthening the European integration process by means of transfrontier, inter-regional and transnational co-operation;
–    a coherent strategy for the integrated and regionally balanced development of our continent, which, while based on the principles of subsidiarity and reciprocity, strengthens competitiveness, co-operation and solidarity among local and regional authorities across borders, thereby making a contribution to democratic stability in Europe.

The Committee of Ministers recommends that member states should use the Guiding Principles as a basis for planning and spatial development measures, implement them in spatial development projects as appropriate and continue establishing administrative bodies at regional and governmental levels in order to facilitate better spatial integration of the various regions of Europe.

The Guiding Principles have six chapters and refer to the main European legal instruments of relevance to spatial planning.

Content of the Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development
of the European Continent

I. Contribution of the guiding principles to the implementation of the social cohesion policy of the Council of Europe

II. Spatial development policies in Europe: new continent-wide challenges and prospects

Intercontinental relationships as strategic elements for European spatial development policy
The multiplicity of cultures
Large European regions as a basis for mutual support and co-operation
Integration of the old and new member states

III. Specific role of the private sector in spatial development

IV. Principles of a planning policy for sustainable development in Europe

Promoting territorial cohesion through a more balanced social and economic development of regions and improved competitiveness
Encouraging development generated by urban functions and improving the relationship between the town and the countryside
Promoting more balanced accessibility
Developing access to information and knowledge
Reducing environmental damage
Enhancing and protecting natural resources and the natural heritage
Enhancing the cultural heritage as a factor for development
Developing energy resources while maintaining safety
Encouraging high quality, sustainable tourism
Limitation of the impact of natural disasters

V. Spatial development measures for different types of European regions

Landscapes
Urban areas
Rural areas
Mountains
Coastal and island regions
Eurocorridors
Flood plains and water meadows
Redundant industrial and military sites
Border regions

VI. Strengthening of co-operation between the member states of the Council of Europe and participation of regions, municipalities and citizens

Possibilities of conceiving a development-oriented spatial planning
Developing Europe-wide co-operation activities on the basis of the guiding principles
Horizontal co-operation
Vertical co-operation
Broadly-based participation of society in the spatial planning process

The main European legal instruments listed below, of relevance to spatial planning, are the following:

–   European Cultural Convention (Paris, France, 19 December 1954);
–   Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern, Switzerland, 19 September 1979);
–   European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (Madrid, Spain, 2 May 1980) and its additional protocols;
–   Florence Charter on the protection of historic parks and gardens (Icomos-Ifla, 1981);
–    European Regional/Spatial Planning Charter (Torremolinos, Spain, 20 May 1983);
–    Convention on the Conservation of the Architectural Heritage of Europe (Grenada, Spain, 3 October 1985);
–    European Charter of Local Self-Government (Strasbourg, France, 15 October 1985);
–    Convention on the Protection of the Alps (Salzburg, Austria, 1991);
–    European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (revised) (Valletta, Malta, 16 January 1992);
–    draft European Charter of Regional Self-Government, 5 June 1997;
–    Baltic Agenda 21 (Nyborg, Denmark, June 1998);
–    European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) (Potsdam, Germany, May 1999);
–    European Landscape Convention (Florence, Italy, 20 October 2000).

In accordance with the concept of sustainability, the Guiding Principles take into account the needs of all the inhabitants of Europe’s regions, without compromising the fundamental rights and development prospects of future generations. They aim in particular at bringing the economic and social requirements to be met by the territory into harmony with its ecological and cultural functions and therefore contributing to long-term, large-scale and balanced spatial development. Their implementation therefore requires close co-operation between spatial planning and sectoral policies, which, through the measures they involve, influence the spatial structures in Europe.

The Guiding Principles also take account of international co-operation at world level, as co-ordinated by the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development. The Council of Europe presented the Guiding Principles at the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 as a contribution to the UN Agenda 21 programme adopted in Rio de Janeiro and to the develop an intercontinental dialogue.

3. Implementation of the Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent: outcome of the last ministerial conferences

The 13th Session of the European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional/Spatial Planning (Ljubljana, Slovenia, 16-17 September 2003) was a milestone in the implementation of the strategies and perspectives for the sustainable spatial development of the European continent. The Ljubljana Declaration on the territorial dimension of spatial development is of crucial importance as regards what may be described as the human right to sustainable development. With a view to the management of the major challenges for sustainable spatial development of the European continent, it states that the relevant policies should be further improved in order to support the balanced polycentric development of the European continent and the formation of functional urban regions, including networks of small and medium-sized towns and rural settlements.

The Declaration states: “Sustainable development is not just an environmental issue. Three aspects of sustainable development have been agreed upon: economic sustainability, environmental sustainability and social sustainability. The first implies economic growth and development, the second includes ecosystem integrity and attention to carrying capacity and biodiversity, whilst the latter includes values such as equity, empowerment, accessibility and participation. In addition to these three components, the Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent introduced a fourth dimension: that of cultural sustainability”. The Declaration also provides that the Ministers of the Member States of the Council of Europe responsible for Regional/Spatial Planning commit themselves to report every three years to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the implementation of the Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent. A method for standardising monitoring of the implementation of the Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent has been drawn up with a view to assessing the spatial development policies of the Council of Europe’s member states.

The Ministerial Conference also:

–    adopted resolutions concerning sustainable development: Resolution No. 1 on public-private partnerships in spatial development policy, Resolution No. 2 on the training of authorities responsible for sustainable development and Resolution No. 3 concerning the prevention of floods and better co-ordination of all activities designed to minimise the risks and the consequences of disastrous floods;
–    took note of the work carried out with a view to the sustainable spatial development of the Tisza/Tisa river basin, as reflected in the signature of the Initiative on the Sustainable Spatial Development of the Tisza/Tisa River Basin by the Ministers responsible for Regional/Spatial Planning of Hungary, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine and the adoption of the Declaration on co-operation concerning the Tisza/Tisa river basin by the same states at the conference;
–    took note of the “European Rural Heritage Observation Guide – CEMAT” [1].

The 14th Session of the CEMAT was organised on the theme of “Networks for sustainable spatial development of the European continent: bridges over Europe” (Lisbon, Portugal, 2006). The following texts geared towards sustainable development were adopted:

–    Lisbon Declaration on “Networks for sustainable spatial development of the European continent: Bridges over Europe”;
–    Resolution No. 1 on “Polycentric development: promoting competitiveness, enhancing cohesion”;
–    Resolution No. 2 on “Territorial governance: empowerment through enhanced co-ordination”;
–    Resolution No. 3 on “The Territorial Agenda of the European Union and its relation to CEMAT”;
–    Spatial Development Glossary on key expressions used in spatial development policies in Europe.

The 15th Session of the CEMAT was organised on the theme of “Challenges of the Future: Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent in a Changing World” (Moscow, Russian Federation, 8-9 July 2010). One hundred and fifty representatives of member states, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the INGO Conference, several Council of Europe steering committees, international governmental organisations and numerous officials from the government, parliament and NGOs of the host country attended the conference.

The Ministers adopted important texts showing how spatial planning policies is becoming a crucial part of governments’ political agenda:

–    Moscow Declaration on “Future challenges: sustainable territorial development of the European     continent in a changing world”;
–    Resolution No. 1 on “The contribution of essential services to the sustainable spatial development         of the European continent”;

– Resolution No. 2 on “The pan-European charter for the rural heritage: Promoting sustainable spatial development”;

– Resolution No. 3 on “The organisation of the 16th Session of the Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Spatial/Regional Planning” [2].

The Declaration considers that the overarching objective of territorial cohesion, as promoted by the Guiding Principles, should be interpreted primarily as a basic territorial dimension of human rights. It represents a fundamental value of European society that can reconcile European citizens and their daily aspirations in terms of human dignity, equity and security, and good living, working and cultural environments, with the unavoidable transformations in production systems and in the international and interregional division of labour, with changes in natural conditions such as climate change, and with the move towards a more multicultural society. The Declaration notes that territorial cohesion is the most comprehensive and ambitious objective which territorial development policies, in conjunction with other public policies, must strive to achieve.

The Resolution No. 1 aims to integrate the “human rights” dimension into spatial development policies and to foster territorial cohesion. Essential services are services that, in the opinion of a member State, need to be generally available. These services, so necessary to the people of Europe, are important for spatial planning policies, especially in rural areas. Lack of access to such services jeopardises the right to an adequate standard of living as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

The Resolution No. 2 contributes to the implementation of the provisions of the Guiding Principles related to “Rural areas” an to “Broadly-based participation of society in the spatial planning process” and to promoting the use of the “European Rural Heritage Observation Guide – CEMAT” (Document 13 CEMAT (2003) 4).

The Resolution No. 3 acknowledge the kind invitation extended by the Government of Greece to host the 16th Session of the CEMAT in 2013 and by the Government of Romania to host the 17th Session of the CEMAT in 2016.

The Ministers also took note of the National reports of the Council of Europe Member States identifying the global evolution of territorial structures and imbalances in recent years, the territorial impacts of emerging and growing challenges and the related driving forces and, finally, the evolution of territorially significant policies.

In keeping with the cross-sectoral approach to sustainable development, the Council of Europe organised the following CEMAT seminars and symposiums between 2001 and 2010 [3] under the work programme of the CEMAT Committee of Senior Officials:

–    “Integration of the greater European spaces”, Thessaloniki, Greece, 25-26 June 2001;
–    “Landscape heritage, spatial planning and sustainable development”, Lisbon, Portugal, 26 27 November 2001;
–    “The role of local and regional authorities in transnational co-operation in the field of regional/spatial development”, Dresden, Germany, 15-16 May 2002 (in co-operation with the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe);
–    “Spatial planning for the sustainable development of particular types of European areas: mountains, coastal zones, rural zones, flood-plains and alluvial valleys”, Sofia, Bulgaria, 23 24 October 2002;
–    “Sustainable spatial development: strengthening intersectoral relations”, Budapest, Hungary, 26-27 March 2003 (in co-operation with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research –UNITAR);
–    “Natural disasters and sustainable spatial development: prevention of floods”, Wrocław, Poland, 30 June 2003;
–    “Spatial development governance: institutional co-operation network”, Yerevan, 28-29 October 2004;
–    “The role of training in the implementation of the policy of sustainable spatial development at local and regional levels in Europe”, Strasbourg, 15 March 2004 (in co-operation with the European Network of Training Organisations for Local and Regional Authorities (ENTO), the Committee on Sustainable Development of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Union of Local Authority Chief Executives of Europe (UDITE));
–    “Urban management in networking Europe”, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 17-18 November 2005;
–    “Sharing responsibility for our region: redefining the public interest for territorial development”, Bratislava, Slovak Republic, 22-23 May 2006 (organised in co-operation with the authorities of the Slovak Republic and the UN Economic Commission for Europe as part of the CEMAT activities);
–    “The accessibility and attractiveness of rural and landlocked areas: sustainable transport and services of general interest”, Andorra la Vella, Andorra, 25-26 October 2007;
–    “Challenges and strategies for metropolises and metropolitan regions, in a context of growing globalisation with regard to economic, social, environmental and cultural development”, St Petersburg, Russian Federation, 26-27 June 2008;
–     “The spatial dimension of human rights: for a new culture of territory”, Yerevan, Armenia, 13-14 October 2008;
–     “A comprehensive approach to balanced sustainable spatial development of the European Continent”, Kyiv, Ukraine, 11 June 2009.

* * *

The whole object of spatial/regional planning is to ensure that human being and the communities in which they live can look ahead to a life spent in the best possible material and spiritual conditions, in a pleasant environment permitting a full development of the individual. It is a means whereby human being and the community in which he lives can contribute towards planning the society in which they would like to live if they could.

Spatial/regional planning is no confined to specific problems of urbanisation, industrial zoning and country planning. It covers the general development of society, take into account the factors transforming that society and ensure that we adapt our land policy not merely to present requirements but also to those of future generations.

It is necessary to highlight that CEMAT activities contribute to improve spatial organisation in Europe and to find solutions to problems that go beyond national frontiers and establish a sense of shared identity that takes account of north-south and east-west relations. They establish spatial development policies that encourage geographical, social and economic cohesion and a more balanced form of competitiveness within regions and they promote also landscape policies, particularly in urban and suburban areas, to improve citizens’ quality of life.

Steep population growth, urbanisation, concentration, competition, regional imbalance, unequal development are the challenges that our societies must recognise and overcome. The solutions and remedies are not exclusively economic. As an instrument in the hands of public authorities spatial planning is closely linked to the search for the common good, and be directed to long-term objectives. The work of CEMAT helps improve governance with an eye to achieving a mode of sustainable spatial development that will prevent – or at least considerably reduce – some aspects of current crises and social difficulties. By improving living conditions and standards, spatial planning is paving the way for a better society, which is one of the main commitments of the Council of Europe.

* * *

Endnotes

The Guide take account of all cultural, natural and landscape aspects of the rural heritage, both tangible and intangible, in their full diversity as factors in and driving forces for development.
The texts of the Moscow Declaration and Resolutions No1 & No2 can be found in the DOCUMENTS Section of MEPIELAN E-Bulletin
The documents and proceedings of the meetings are published in the Council of Europe’s “Spatial Planning and Landscape” and “Territorial and Landsacpe” Council of Europe series and are available on the Council of Europe CEMAT Website.

* Websites of the Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Spatial/Regional Planning (CEMAT):
http://www.coe.int/CEMAT;
http://www.coe.int/CEMAT/fr
See also
http://www.coe.int/EuropeanLandscapeConvention;
http://www.coe.int/Conventioneuropeennedupaysage

The Copenhagen Accord: The Failure of Multilateral Diplomacy?

by Steinar Andresen, Senior Research Fellow, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway — Fri, 16 Jul 2010 00:00:00 GMT

What is the history of negotiations over the climate regime, what has been achieved and what does the future of this process look like?

1.   The Development of the Climate Regime

The modern scientific history of global climate change goes back to the late 1950s. For the next two decades it was exclusively a scientific issue discussed among scientists and between scientific institutions. In the 1980s it reached the international political agenda and in 1988 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established. In 1989 formal negotiations under the auspices of the UN started and the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted at the Rio Summit in 1992. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997, but agreement on how the Protocol should be interpreted was not achieved until the Marrakech Accord in 2001. It took another four years of ratifications before the protocol came into force (2005). The next milestone was the adoption of the Bali Roadmap in 2007, marking the start of the negotiations over a follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol, leading to the Copenhagen Accord at COP 15 in 2009. In short, negotiations over a climate regime has now gone on for more than two decades. What has been achieved?

2.   Achievements

Judging what has been achieved depends upon the measurement rod applied. If a cognitive approach is chosen, knowledge about this extremely complex problem has increased strongly, not least due to the massive scientific effort by the IPCC. On the political front progress has also been made in terms of new and innovative approaches like quota trading, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD). If we contrast the achievements with the goal of this regime as well as scientific advice, however, progress is exceedingly modest. The Parties have made commitments to a long-term goal of stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations at a level that ‘would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ (UNFCCC/Art.2). This has later been translated into a seemingly modest goal of avoiding more than a 2 degree Celsius temperature increase. Based on the regulations agreed upon there is no chance to reach this goal. Even in the unlikely event of full compliance with the Kyoto Protocol it will have a very modest effect on the temperature increase and the Copenhagen Accord represents no improvement in this regard. Scientists have long warned that strong emission reductions are necessary but emissions are increasing at an accelerating rate.

It is not difficult to explain the modest progress. This problem is extremely ‘malign’ as it is characterized by deep political conflicts. The North-South conflict is most profound and disagreement over fairness, historical responsibility and differentiated commitments looms large. More generally, the benefits of abatements are long-term and diffuse while costs tend to be up-front and concentrated, making forceful action exceedingly difficult.

Still, when contrasting achievements with the enormous global political and institutional efforts, questions can be posed on the effectiveness of the UN process. Let us just consider the process since the adoption of the ‘Bali-Roadmap’ in 2007. In 2008 four global rounds of negotiations were arranged prior to COP 14 in Poznan. Still, essentially nothing was achieved because two key actors did not take an active part. The US was passive as the outgoing Bush Jr. administration had no real negotiation mandate and the EU was preoccupied with its own internal negotiations. UN efforts were strengthened even more in 2009 to have a text ready well in advance of COP 15 and five global conferences took place prior to Copenhagen. They were all characterized by strong polarization and lack of progress. The new US administration was more positive to action than the previous one, however, the financial crisis and calls for a health reform prevented the adoption of a Climate Law before COP 15. Already before Copenhagen it therefore became clear that the goal of a legally binding approach would not be achieved.

The Copenhagen meeting itself was also no victory for the UN and multilateral diplomacy. When the state leaders arrived there was no text whatsoever so the risk of a fiasco was imminent. The main reason was again the deep-seated conflict between the North and the South. The EU had accepted only one negotiation track promoted by the US in order to get the emerging large economies to take on some kind of commitments. The South, however, wanted the two-track approach to be continued - a Kyoto approach for the developed countries and a UNFCCC track for the South (Annex II Parties). It was not multilateral diplomacy that saved the Copenhagen meeting from disaster, but exclusive negotiations behind closed doors among a handful of nations, the US and the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, India, China and South Africa). The outcome was 2 ½ pages, the Copenhagen Accord. In line with US preferences this was a soft-law ‘pledge and review’ document, in stark contrast to the top-down and legally binding approach of the Kyoto Protocol. Besides the US, China was most important in influencing the outcome and successfully stripped the document of most numerical obligations. Most Parties accepted the Accord as the best outcome possible to reach – although many were dissatisfied. A few developing countries, however, did not accept it and its legal standing is therefore highly uncertain. There are different opinions on the Accord. In the US it is viewed as a decent start, a stepping stone for further negotiations. In contrast, most European voices are negative, seeing it more as a ‘side-step’ than a stepping stone.

3.   The Future of the Climate Regime

Although there are different opinions on the Copenhagen Accord, considering the massive global effort it is hard to escape the conclusion that it reminds us of the metaphor of the ‘mountain that gave birth to a mouse’. Considering the lack of progress and the fact that the end game was decided by a handful of nations behind closed doors it questions both the significance of multilateral diplomacy as well as the role of the UN. To secure the legitimacy of process as well as results, the UN is also needed further down the road, but considering the modest progress alternative and more exclusive forums among major economies (and emitters) are needed as well. Various co-operative ventures along these lines exist and need to intensify efforts. They reflect the new geo-political realities as they all include the emerging economies. Under real life circumstances we see that the major emitters call the final shots, regardless of framework, but if progress is made in more limited forums, results need to be channeled into the UN process to secure interaction and coordination between various approaches. Considering it took more than seven years before the Kyoto Protocol was ratified, a legally binding follow-up is a distant dream. Economic recession and factors unrelated to climate change have so far been more important in bringing emissions down than concerted global efforts. Considering the expected long-term growth in populations and economies of developing countries there is little reason for future optimism.

References

Andresen, S. and Skodvin, T., ‘The Climate Regime: Achievements and Challenges’ in D Vidas and J.P Schei (eds) The World Ocean in Globalisation: Challenges and Responses, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers/Brill (Forthcoming 2010)
Røgeberg, O., Andresen, S., and Holtsmark, B., ‘International Climate Treaties : The Case for Pessimism, Climate Law 1 (2010) (Forthcoming).